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Abstract 
This  report reviews  research on the effectiveness of acreage reduction 
programs  and describes  the methodology developed for  the Static World  Policy 
Simulation  (SWOPSIM)  modeling  framework  to capture the effect of removing 
these programs.  It also analyzes  the results of several sensitivity tests of 
a  SWOPSIM  model  used by the  Economic  Research Service to study the effects of 
agricultural trade liberalization.  Assumptions  concerning how  U.S.  acreage 
reduction programs  are modeled significantly influence predictions as  to how 
trade liberalization affects commodity  prices,  production,  and trade. 
However,  these assumptions  do  not significantly influence predictions of how 
trade liberalization affects producer welfare.  In terms of trade 
liberalization analysis,  more  crucial are  the assumptions  regarding 
agricultural commodity  supply elasticities and the degree  to which U.S. 
agricultural policies are decoup1ed  from production. 
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ii ASSESSING  MODEL  ASSUMPTIONS  IN  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  MODELING: 
AN  APPLICATION  TO  SWOPSIM 
Introduction 
Pressure  for  reform of domestic agricultural policies has been building for 
some  time.  The  Uruguay  Round  of multilateral trade negotiations under  the 
auspices of the General Agreement  of Tariffs and Trade  (GATT)  is a  historic 
opportunity to reform agricultural policies and liberalize trade.  Economists 
and policymakers  concerned with the effect of trade liberalization must  deal 
with the effects of removing  the myriad policy instruments  that currently 
distort global agricultural production and trade. 
The  Static World Policy Simulation  (SWOPSIM)  modeling  framework has been used 
to construct a  model  (ST86)  designed to estimate  the effects of agricultural 
trade liberalization by the  industrial market  economies.  The  construction of 
the model  required the  adoption of a  modeling structure and  the choice of 
model  parameters  for use  in evaluating agricultural policy reform.  Although 
the  objective of the model  is complicated,  its structure is relatively simple: 
it is a  price wedge  model  based on reduced-form supply and  demand  equations. 
Producer and consumer  subsidy equivalents  (PSE's  and CSE's,  respectively)  are 
used as price wedges  that capture  the effects of government policies on 
production and consumption of agricultural commodities. 
As  with any  economic  policy modeling exercise,  it is  important that the 
sensitivity of model  results to economic  and policy parameters be  examined. 
We  analyzed the results of sensitivity tests on three key sets of parameters 
used in ST86.  The  first set consists of the  supply shift terms  used to model 
the  removal  of acreage reduction programs.  Because  these programs  involve 
quantitative restrictions that restrict output,  their effects are not captured 
in the  PSE  framework.  Instead,  the effect of removing quantitative 
restrictions is modeled as an explicit shift in a  commodity's  supply schedule. 
The  second is the  PSE.  The  PSE  is a  measure  of the value of transfers  from 
government  and consumers  to  farm producers.  The  SWOPSIM  formulation assumes 
that the entire PSE  is coupled to  (or directly affects)  farm production 
decisions.  However,  recent research indicates that U.S.  agricultural policies 
may,  in fact,  be  decoupled.  The  third set of parameters  examined is the 
supply elasticities for agricultural commodities.  The  size of the 
elasticities represent the degree  to which resources used in agriculture have 
alternative uses.  If agricultural resources  are  immobile,  then removal  of 
output-expanding subsidies will have  less effect on production than previously 
published results indicate. 
The  Kodel 
The  model  ST86  is a  static, partial equilibrium model  of world agricultural 
trade that has been used by the U.S.  Department of Agriculture's  Economic 
1 Research Service  (USDA,ERS)  to analyze  the  economic  effects of agricultural 
trade liberalization by  the  industrial market  economies  (Roningen and Dixit, 
1989).1  The  model  was  constructed in the  SWOPSIM  framework  (Roningen 1986) 
using the  ST86  database  (Sullivan,  Wainio,  and Roningen,  1989). 
Models  created by the  SWOPSIM  procedure are  in spreadsheets  and are modified 
and solved as  spreadsheets.  They  are characterized by an economic  structure 
that includes constant elasticity supply and demand  equations  and  summary 
policy measures.  For each region  i  and each commodity  j  in the  model,  demand 
and  supply functions  are modeled as  follows: 
Dij=Dij (CPij• CPia• Xii)  (1) 
(2) 
where  CPij  and  PPij  are  domestic  incentive prices  facing  consumers  and 
producers,  respectively,  of commodity  j  in country i.  CPik  and  PPik  are 
consumer  and producer prices of commodities closely related to  commodity  j  in 
either consumption or production,  respectively.  CP~ in the  demand  function 
accounts  for substitution possibilities in consumption.  CPik  in the supply 
function accounts  for  the use of commodity  k  as an  intermediate  input in the 
production of commodity j. PPik  in the  supply function represents substitution 
possibilities for  the producer.  Xih  in the demand  function accounts  for  the 
derived demand  for  the product as  an intermediate  input for  the production of 
Xih .  Xih  is typically a  livestock quantity which enters  into demand  functions 
for  feed.  Trade  is the difference between domestic  supply and  demand: 
(3) 
Domestic  incentive prices depend on the level of consumer  and producer  support 
(measured in terms  of consumer  and producer price wedges  CSWij  and  PSWij)  and 
on world prices denominated in local currency: 
(4) 
(5) 
where  Ei  is the  exchange  rate of i  with respect to  the U.S.  dollar,  and WPj  is 
the world reference price of j  measured in U.S.  dollars.  Functional 
relationships F(  )  and G(  )  allow a  specification of world to domestic prices 
1The  industrial market economies as defined here include the United States, 
Canada,  the European Community. (EC-12),  Other Western Europe,  Japan,  Australia, 
and New  Zealand. 
2 to be  1e8s  than or equal to 1.  If equal  to 1,  then 100 percent of a  world 
price change  i8  transmitted domestically.  A value  less than 1  indicates  that 
the  government  intervenes  to cushion domestic  producers or consumers  from 
experiencing the full change. 
World markets clear when  net trade of a  commodity  across all regions  sums  to 
zero: 
(6) 
ST86  covers  22  agricultural commodities  and  includes  11  countries/regions. 
Livestock commodities  include beef and veal,  pork,  mutton and lamb,  poultry 
meat,  poultry eggs,  milk,  butter,  cheese,  and milk powder.  The  crops  include 
wheat,  corn,  other coarse grains  (barley,  rye,  oats,  sorghum,  millet,  mixed 
grains),  rice,  soybeans,  other oi1seeds,  cotton,  sugar,  and  tobacco.  Other 
commodities  included are  soybean meal,  soybean oil,  other oilseed meals,  and 
other oilseed oils.  Tropical products are not  included.  The 
countries/regions modeled are  the United States,  Canada,  the  European 
Community  (EC-12),  Other Western Europe,  Japan,  Australia,  New  Zealana, 
developing exporters  (Brazil,  Argentina,  Indonesia,  Thailand,  Kalaysia, 
Philippines),  newly  industrialized Asia  (South Korea,  Taiwan,  other east 
Asia),  centrally planned economies  (Eastern Europe,  Soviet Union,  China), 
developing  importers,  and  the rest of the world. 
The  economic effects of trade liberalization are estimated by removing  PSE's, 
CSE's,  and quantitative restrictions for  the  industrial market  economies  in 
the base model  and  then simulating the model  to obtain a  new  equilibrium 
solution.  The  difference between the base  and new  solutions reflects the 
effect of removing  support in the base year  (1986)  given a  5-year period of 
adjustment. 
Producer and Consumer  Subsidy Equivalents 
The  summary  policy measures  used in the model  are PSE's  and CSE's  calculated 
by  ERS  researchers  and analysts  (USDA,1988).  The  PSE  is a  measure of the 
amount  of income  that a  producer would have  to be  compensated to be as well 
off after the  removal of government support under current programs  and at 
current prices.  Likewise,  the  CSE  is a  measure  of the  amount  of income  that a 
consumer would have  to be  compensated to be  as well off after the  removal  of 
government  support.  In the model,  PSE's  and CSE's  are used as price wedges 
that separate world commodity prices from  domestic producer and consumer 
prices.  Agricultural policy reform is modeled by removing  these wedges  (and 
the quantitative restrictions they do  not capture)  and  then observing the 
effects on production,  consumption,  trade,  prices,  and other important 
economic variables. 
3 There  are  a  variety of technical  issues  involved in calculating PSE's  and 
CSE's.  Because  they are aggregate measures  of support,  the effects of many 
types  of distortionary policies must be  combined.  Table  1  provides  examples 
of policies that are  typically included in PSE  estimates.  Calculation of 
PSE's  is based primarily on government budget  figures or the difference 
between domestic  and world reference prices.2 
Table  l--Exaaplea of policies  included in PSI estimates 
MIIrket  price support: 
o  ~tic  price supports  linked with  border ...aure (quotas,  pe  ...  its, tariffs, variable levi",  and 
export  r ..  titutions) 
o  Tariffs and  export  tax  .. 
o  Two-price syat_ and ho. consUlllption  sch .... 
o  Price pr ..  iu.. (often uaed  for fluid .ilk) 
o  Do.eatic price supports  l inked  with  production quotas 
o  CCC  irwentory and  c~ity  loan activities 
o  MIIrketing  board price stabi l ization pol icies 
o  State treding operations 
D  i rec:t  i nco. support: 
o  Direct  pI~ts -- deficiency,  disaster,  direct storage,  headage  and  acreage div.rsion,  PIK 
entitl...,u, stabi l ization pa~ts, and  other direct goverrwent  pa~ts 
o  Producer coresponsibility l.vies (negative support) 
Progr_ affecting variable costs of production: 
o  Fertilizer s~idi  .. 
o  Fuel  tax eXellllptions 
o  eonc ..  sional da.estic credit for production  loans 
o  Irrigation ~idies 
o  Crop  i naurance 
Progr_ affecting _rk.ting of co.oditi ..  : 
o  Trenaportation subsidies 
o  Mllrketing  and  pro.otion progr_ 
o  lnapection services 
Progr_ affecting  long-t  .... agricul tural  production: 
o  R  ....  rch  end  .xtension services 
o  Conservation and  erwiror.ental progr_ 
o  Structural progr_ 
Controlled exchenge  rat  ..  : 
o  Fixed  rates 
o  Differential  rates 
o  Crawling-peg  rat  .. 
Source:  U.S.D ••• ,  Government  InterYention  in AGriculture:  Measurement.  Evaluation.  and  Implications for 
Trade  Negotiations,  Econ.  R  ... Serv.,  FAER-229,  Apr.  1987. 
2For  information on how  PSE's  and  CSE's  were  calculated for  1982-86,  see 
(USDA,1988). 
4 An  important aspect of PSE's  and eSE's  is that they are based on an  income 
compensation principle.  Unlike  the effective rate of protection  (ERP),  the 
PSE  is not meant  to be  a  measure  of trade distortion.3  The  individual 
components  are not weighted by their effects on either production or 
consumption.  This  spec"ification implies  that individual  components  of the  PSE 
or eSE  are perfect substitutes.  Hertel  (1989)  has  shown  that reducing 
agricultural support  through  PSE  reduction depends  crucially on  the specific 
policy instruments  in place or on  those  instruments  chosen for reform. 
Specifically,  he  shows  that effects on output,  factor employment,  land rental, 
and exports differ according to whether  support is reduced in the  form  of an 
output subsidy,  input subsidy,  or export subsidy.  Only where  there  is no 
input substitutability in the production of a  good will equal cost reductions 
in output and input subsidies have  the  same  effects.  Because  inputs are not 
explicitly modeled in ST86,  the no-substitutability assumption is embedded  in 
its structure. 
An  important point to remember  about  PSE's  is that they do  not capture  the 
effect of programs  that involve quantitative restrictions which ultimately 
restrict output,  such as U.s  and Japanese  acreage  reduction programs.  If PSE's 
and eSE's  are used in a  modeling  framework  as  summary  policy measures,  then 
the effect of removing quantitative restrictions must be modeled separately. 
In ST86,  the effect of removing quantitative restrictions is modeled as an 
explicit shift in a  commodity's  supply curve. 
The  Xechanica of SWOPSIH 
In a  typical trade liberalization scenario,  government  programs  affecting 
agricultural production and consumption are  removed.  The  scenario may  involve 
one  country removing its policies  (unilateral liberalization) or a  number  of 
countries  removing their policies  (multilateral liberalization).  The  top 
panel of figure  1  illustrates the unilateral case.  The  undistorted domestic 
supply and demand  curves are  shown  as  Sand 0  in the left graph.  The  excess 
supply  (ES)  curve  in the right graph represents  the amount  available  to be 
exported along  a  schedule of world price levels,  after domestic  demand  has 
been satisfied.  The  excess  demand  (ED)  represents  rest-of-wor1d demand  for 
the product.  Its intersection with  ES  determines  the world price and the 
level of trade.  In the figure,  it is assumed  that domestic production is 
subsidized at a  constant unit level.  SS  in the left graph represents  the 
subsidy-laden supply curve.  It is vertically separated from  S by the  amount 
of the unit subsidy.  At  each world price level,  domestic production is 
greater than without the  subsidy because producers  receive  the  subsidy in 
3The  ERP  incorporates the influence of government intervention on output and 
intermediate  input prices.  It measures  the percentage change  in value-added of 
a sector with and without trade distortions. It is essentially a weighted average 
of producers'  nominal rate of protection for output,  and consumers'  nominal rate 
of protection for intermediates, adjusted by the set of undistorted input-output 
coefficients. See Schwartz and Parker (1989) for a discussion of various measures 






Figure I--Trade liberalization and SWOPSIM 
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Q  6  ~--------------------- Q addition to the world price for  each unit of production.  The  amount  available 
for export is greater with the  subsidy.  In the right graph,  the  curve  ESS  is 
the excess  supply curve  incorporating the  subsidy.  Its intersection with  ED 
determines  the initial world price level  PWo.  The  domestic  producer  incentive 
price is  PDo  (PWo  plus  the  subsidy),  and Qo  is produced.  If the subsidy is 
removed,  production decreases  and  the  amount  available for export decreases. 
SS  no  longer exists,  and  ES  is the  new  excess  supply curve.  The  world price 
increases  to  PWl ,  and  the domestic producer  incentive price decreases  to  POl' 
which is equal to  PWl  (assuming away  transport,  processing,  and other 
differentials).  Production falls  to Ql' 
The  middle panels  show  a  multilateral liberalization scenario.  Countries 
constituting the  rest-of-world aggregate region also  remove  policies that 
distort agricultural production and trade.  Along  a  schedule of world prices, 
there is less foreign production,  and demand  has  remained the  same. 
Therefore,  there is greater demand  for  imports.  In the  figure,  the excess 
demand  curve shifts rightward to  EDL.  The  new  higher equilibrium world price 
is  PWz.  At this higher world price,  domestic producers  increase production to 
Qz· 
The  bottom panel  shows  the  removal  of an acreage  reduction program.  Land 
withheld from  production is reintroduced to produce  additional output along 
the  schedule of world prices.  S shifts rightward to S',  and  ES 
correspondingly shifts out to ES'.  With  increased excess  supply,  the world 
price drops  from  PWz  to  PW3  to restore equilibrium to the world market.  The 
amount  by which  the world price decreases  depends  on how  much  domestic  supply 
is increased when  diverted land returns  to production.  In the figure, 
domestic production is shown  to  increase  from  Qz  to  Q3  at a  world price of 
PW3 • 
U.S.  Policies for Grain and Cotton 
U.S.  policies for grain and cotton have been characterized by  two  essential 
features:  participation in the programs  is voluntary,  and program benefits are 
linked to program obligations.  As  a  result,  the level of program participation 
depends  on a  weighing of expected program benefits and obligations. 
The  primary benefit to participants is the deficiency payment.  It is a  direct 
payment  to the producer equal  to  the difference between the  target price and 
the higher of either the  loan rate or the average market price of the first 5 
months  of the marketing year.  Price supports are maintained through 
nonrecourse  loans by the  Commodity  Credit Corporation  (CCC)  to participating 
producers at the loan rate.  The  crop serves as collateral.  If the market price 
falls below the loan rate,  the producer may  payoff the  loan by forfeiting the 
crop  to  the  CCC.  The  nonrecourse loan program supports production by providing 
7 market stability through an effective price floor. 4 
Participating producers  receive deficiency payments based on their base 
acreage  and program yield.  Under  the  Food  and Agriculture Act of 1981,  program 
acreage was  determined by the mUltiplying a  program allocation factor by  the 
number  of acres planted for harvest on individual farms.  This  factor  ranged 
between 80  and 100 percent,  depending on harvest projections.  The  program 
yield was  estimated by USDA  based on historical yields adjusted for abnormal 
factors.  The  act included a  proven-yield provision which allowed farmers  to 
substitute actual yields if they were higher  than their program yields. 
Therefore,  under  the  1981  act,  deficiency payments  were  tied to actual yields 
and acreage  and,  thus,  encouraged farmers  to expand plantings and increase 
yields.  Thus,  deficiency payments  were highly coupled to,  and directly 
affected,  the  level of production. 
The  Food  Security Act of 1985  changed the  linkage between deficiency payments 
and production  (Miller and House).  The  acreage base was  set at the average 
number  of acres planted (diversion and set-aside are considered planted)  over 
the preceding 5  years,  not to exceed the  average of the last 2  years.  At most, 
only 20  percent of an acreage  change  could show  up  in the calculation of 
deficiency payments  in the  following year.  Also,  the  50-92  provision permitted 
no  loss of base  acreage  in the calculation of deficiency payments if at least 
50  percent  (or in some  cases 0  percent)  were planted in the permitted crop. 
The  program payment yield was  set at the average  farm  payment yields during 
1981-85,  excluding the highest and  lowest yields.  Thus,  the  1985  act removed 
the direct linkage between increased production and deficiency payments  that 
characterized the  1981  act. 
Nevertheless,  deficiency payments still may  indirectly influence  the  level of 
production.  Miller and House  divide deficiency payments  into  two  components. 
The  first is a  production adjustment  component  that compensates  the producer 
for  income  forgone  plus conservation costs  on idled acres.  This portion of the 
deficiency payment affects the producer's decision to participate in the 
program and,  hence,  will have  an effect on production.  The  second component  is 
an  income  component.  It increases  economic  rents earned by fixed resources. 
Although it may  attract excess  resources  into the sector that may  enhance 
production,  Miller and House  speculate that its effect in the  long run is 
small  and probably unmeasurable. 
In 1986  (the base year for  ST86) ,  deficiency payments  constituted a  major 
portion of the  PSE  for program commodities:  61  percent for wheat,  62  percent 
for corn,  43  percent for other coarse grains,  and  51  percent for rice. 
Deficiency payments  (like other components  of the  PSE)  are modeled as price 
wedges  that raise domestic producer  incentive prices above  world levels.  The 
total value of deficiency payments  for  a  crop  is spreadout over total 
4The  Food Security Act of 1985 provided additional program benefits to rice 
and cotton producers  through a  marketing loan program,  and to wheat  and coarse 
grain producers  through  the  Findlay  loan.  Essentially,  these  measures  allowed 
participating  producers  to  receive  additional  deficiency  payments  if market 
prices were  below loan rate levels.  See  Glaser  (1986)  for additional details. 
8 production ex post to calculate the wedge.  This  is consistent with the 
SWOPSIM  modeling structure only if deficiency payments  are fully coupled. 
Although deficiency payments  may  have been fully coupled under provisions of 
the  Food  and Agriculture Act of 1981,  Miller and House  argue  that they 
definitely were not under  the  Food  Security Act of 1985.  Other policies 
included in the U.S.  PSE's  for grains  and cotton,  such as  government 
expenditures  on agricultural research and extension programs,  subsidized grain 
inspection services,  grain storage subsidies,  and interest subsidies may  also 
be partially decoupled.  The  possibility that deficiency payments  and other 
U.S.  programs  for grains  and cotton may  be  decoupled has not been accounted 
for  in previously published model  results. 
Effectiveness of Acreage Reduction Programs 
The  effectiveness of acreage  reduction programs  in reducing supply has been 
encapsulated in the  term "slippage."  Slippage describes  the situation where 
the effectiveness of these programs  is less than the number  of idled acres 
would suggest,  because of a  variety of actions  taken by farmers  which offset 
the effect of acreage restrictions on the quantity of the  commodity  supplied. 
Slippage can arise  from  a  number  of sources.  One  type of slippage,  referred 
to as  acreage slippage,  occurs when  harvested acres  change by less than the 
change  in acres diverted under  the programs  (Ericksen and Collins,  1985). 
Acreage  slippage arises in the United States in part because not all farmers 
participate in the programs.  Farmers  operating outside the  commodity  programs 
are able to sow  as much  land as  they wish to program crops.  As  program 
participants cut back on acreage  sown  to comply with acreage restrictions and, 
thus,  retain eligibility for program payments,  nonparticipants often expand 
acreage  in anticipation of higher prices. 
For participating farmers  c  well,  the program provisions may  have  a  number  of 
incentives  that diminish  the effectiveness of the acreage restrictions over 
time  and,  thus,  contribute to acreage  slippage.  For  example,  the relative 
price stability of U.S.  program provisions may  have  encouraged risk-averse 
farmers  to bring additional land into production above what would have been 
used in the absence of the programs.  In addition,  some  discretion in area 
eligibility under  the programs  may  have  allowed farmers  to declare fallow and 
other nonproductive  land as program acreage,  so when  land needs  to be 
withdrawn under an acreage restriction provision,  farmers  are able to comply 
with little effective reduction in acreage planted.  Noncompliance  on  the part 
of participating farmers  also can lead to acreage  slippage. 
Another  type of slippage associated with commodity  programs  is yield slippage. 
Yield slippage occurs when  acreage reduction programs  lead to an increase in 
average yields,  thereby reducing the effectiveness of the programs.  Yield 
slippage can arise from  three sources.  The  first source is an accounting 
problem.  Because  farmers  rationally choose  to withdraw their least productive 
land from  production first,  average  reported yields can be  expected to rise. 
Secondly,  farmers  may  substitute other inputs  (such as fertilizer,  chemicals, 
9 water, ,labor,  or capital)  for  land,  thereby  increasing yields  on  the  land 
remaining in production.  And  finally,  withdrawing  land from  production one 
year may  boost yields on that same  land in the  following year because of the 
retention of higher levels of soil moisture  and nutrients. 
Approaches  to Quantifying Slippage 
Various  approaches have been used to quantify the effect of slippage on  the 
effectiveness of acreage  reduction programs  (table 2).  The  following section 
draws  on literature identified by Norton  (1985),  supplemented with a  number  of 
more  recent sources. 
Table  2--Acreage  slippage coefficients for the United States 
Study 
Houck  and  Ryan 
(1972) 
Sharples and walker 
(1974) 
Ericksen and 
Richardaon  (1975) 
Garst  and  Miller 
( 1975) 
Tweeten  (1979) 
Bancroft  (1981) 
Gadson,  Price and 
Salathe (1982) 




















Norton  (1985)  1948-82 1/  -0.080 
1948-82 V  0.339 
Dvoskin  (1988)  1956-85 
-- = Not  availeble 
Y  Corn  and soybeans  cCllllbinecl. 
Y  For  paid diversion progr_. 













!V  Short-run esti ..  te for short-ten. acreage diver.ion progr_. 
~ Long-run Hti ..  te for short-ten. acreage diver.ion progr_. 
~ Short-run HU ..  te for  long-ten. land retir....,t progr_. 
1/  Long-run Hti ..  te for  long-ten. land retir..."t progr_. 
Dats  Sorgh  ... 
0.520 
0.646 
0.380  0.420 
AI  Calculated  fr~ coefficients esti ..  ted using ....  ingly unrelated regression (SUR). 















0.340 Acreage  Slippage 
One  of the  seminal pieces of work  on acreage  response  to  farm  program 
variables was  that of Houck  and Ryan  (1972).  They  estimated acreage  supply 
equations  for corn using weighted corn prices and acreage diversion payments 
for corn as  the main explanatory variables.  The  diversion variable weights 
diversion payment rates by eligible diversion acreage.  Yield changes were 
assumed  to be  independent of acreage  changes,  a  strong assumption. 
Houck  and Ryan  also estimated an equation for corn acres diverted,  with 
weighted acreage diversion payments  for corn as  the only explanatory variable. 
The  coefficient estimated for acreage diversion payments  in this equation is 
roughly double  the absolute value of the coefficient estimated for  the acreage 
diversion variable in the  area-planted equations.  This  indicates that for  a 
given increase in the acreage diversion variable,  corn acres planted decreased 
by only half the  amount  by which corn acres diverted increased.  The  results 
obtained by Houck  and Ryan  imply an acreage  slippage coefficient of 0.50 for 
corn.  The  time period covered in this study,  1949-69,  includes only paid 
diversion programs. 
Sharples  and Walker  (1974)  estimated the effect of acreage diverted from  crop 
production by wheat and feed grain programs  on  the planted acreage of row 
crops  (corn and  soybeans)  in the North Central region of the United States. 
Planted acreage of row  crops  was  estimated as  a  function of the acreage 
diverted under  the wheat,  feed grain,  and cotton programs,  a  time  trend,  and a 
dummy  variable representing changes  in program rules for diverting cropland 
for 1971-72.  They  found  that for each acre  increase in diversion or set-aside 
over 1961-72,  total acres planted in row  crops declined by only 0.621 acres. 
This  implies  that for every acre diverted from  production under  these 
programs,  0.379  (1  - 0.621)  acre  is effectively retained in production of row 
crops  due  to actions  taken by both participating and nonparticipating farmers 
(the model  cannot determine which). 
Ericksen  (1976)  defined acreage  slippage in the  following  terms: 
(7) 
where: 
AS 1  - acreage  slippage for crop 1, 
~  - acreage of crop  1  that farmers  would harvest under program provisions 
without acreage diversion requirements, 
AHl  - actual acreage  of crop  1  harvested under  the  same  program provisions 
with acreage diversion requirements,  and 
ADl  - acreage of crop  1  diverted. 
11 The  acreage  slippage coefficient defined by Ericksen can range between 0  and 
1.  A coefficient of 0  means  that the  land diversion requirement  is 100 
percent effective in reducing acreage harvested,  that is acreage harvested 
falls by the full amount  of acreage  idled under  the program.  A coefficient of 
1,  on  the other hand,  indicates that the  land diversion requirement has  had no 
effect on acreage harvested. 
Since  the value of ~  is not known,  the acreage  slippage coefficient  (AS 1) 
cannot be calculated directly.  However,  as  Houck  and Ryan,  and Sharples  and 
Walker had already demonstrated,  econometric estimates can be used to measure 
the  acreage  slippage concept defined above. 
Ericksen reported the results of some  unpublished research undertaken with 
Richardson in which  they analyze  factors affecting total cropland use 
(cropland harvested plus failure plus  fallow).  In the model  they formulated, 
a  lagged parity ratio was  used to capture farmers'  expectations of net returns 
for  the current year.  A second variable,  land idled in the  acreage reserve 
programs  (annual  and long  term)  was  used to  estimate the effect of diverted 
acreage  on total cropland use  independent of net returns expectations.  The 
model,  based on data for  1937-73,  was  able  to explain a  large proportion of 
variation in total crop acreage.  The  acreage  slippage coefficient implied by 
their results is 0.40  (1  - 0.6),  where  0.6  is the estimated coefficient for 
the  acreage reserve variable). 
Garst and Miller  (1975)  estimated the effect of the  acreage diversion and set-
aside programs  on U.S.  wheat  acreage  over 1961-74.  They  attempted to isolate 
the effects of policy and price variables using ordinary least squares  (OLS). 
Total acreage planted to all wheat,  spring wheat,  and winter wheat were 
estimated separately as  a  function of acreage  allotments,  additional paid 
diversion acres  for wheat,  wheat acres set-aside,  lagged real producer prices 
for wheat,  and dummy  variables representing changes  in policy instruments at 
discrete times. 
The  coefficients on  the wheat set-aside variable in the all wheat  and spring 
wheat equations were  not significant and were  found  to be highly correlated 
with the price variable.  To  eliminate problems  of multicollinearity between 
the price variable and  the set-aside variable,  the price  term was  dropped. 
With this formulation,  Garst and Miller estimated coefficients for both the 
diversion and set-aside programs.  Their estimates  imply an acreage  slippage 
coefficient for all wheat of 0.39  for diversion programs  and 0.59  for set-
aside programs.  The  implied acreage slippage coefficients for winter wheat 
are 0.70 for diversion and 0.72  for set-aside,  and for spring wheat 0.25 for 
diversion and 0.38  for set-aside.  The  analysis  showed  that diversion programs 
were  more  effective than set-aside programs  in reducing wheat area.  Garst and 
Miller expected that slippage would be  smaller under  the diversion programs 
because  the acreage  requirements were  more  restrictive than those of the set-
aside programs. 
Tweeten  (1979)  estimated an acreage  response equation for total cropland 
harvested as part of an analysis of the social cost of government production 
controls.  Cropland harvested ~as specified as  a  function of lagged cropland 
harvested,  acres diverted by short-term acreage-diversion programs,  acres  in 
12 long-term land retirement programs,  the ratio of crop prices to prices paid by 
farmers,  and a  time  trend.  He  estimated the equation using annual data for 
1959-75  and OLS. 
His  results  indicate that each acre  increase  in short-term diversion programs 
decreased cropland harvested by 0.65  acre  in the  short run and by 0.74 acre  in 
the  long run.  Each  acre  increase in long-term land retirement programs  is 
estimated to decrease cropland harvested by 0.57  acre  in the short run and by 
0.64 acre in the  long run.  The  implied acreage  slippage coefficients for 
short-term diversion programs  are 0.35  in the short run and 0.26  in the  long 
run-.  For  long-term land retirement programs,  the  implied slippage 
coefficients are 0.43  for  the short run and 0.36  for  the  long run.  Based on 
these results,  Tweeten suggests  that approximately  2  of 3  diverted acres would 
return to crop production if government diversion programs were  eliminated. 
Recognizing that participating and nonparticipating farmers  may  respond 
differently to changes  in farm policies and market conditions,  Bancroft  (1981) 
estimated separate acreage  response  equations  for  each group of producers  for 
the model  he  developed in his Ph.D.  dissertation.  The  response of  . 
participating farmers  was  captured in two  equations,  one  that estimated total 
program participation (acres planted and idled by participants)  and a  second 
that explained additional land diverted beyond minimum  diversion or set-aside 
require~ents.  A third equation explained the  response of nonparticipants.  In 
this equation,  acres planted by nonparticipants  to a  particular crop were 
estimated as  a  function of acres diverted or set-aside in the program for that 
crop,  acres planted in the  program for  that crop,  the average of  market and 
program real expected net returns per acre  for  competing crops,  real expected 
market net returns per acre  for  that crop,  a  time  trend,  and selected dummy 
variables. 
Bancroft estimated equations  for wheat,  corn,  barley,  and sorghum using OLS 
and annual data for  1959-79.  His  results indicate that the net effect of a 
l-acre increase in wheat diversion or set-aside was  to decrease plantings of 
wheat by 0.79 of an acre.  This  implies  an acreage  slippage coefficient of 
0.21  (1  - 0.79)  for wheat,  somewhat  lower  than those  of Garst and Killer 
(table 2).  Bancroft's estimates of acreage  slippage  for corn  (0.36),  sorghum 
(0.52),  and barley  (0.61)  suggest that the wheat  program was  the most 
effective in terms of withdrawing land from production. 
The  approach used by Bancroft was  subsequently incorporated into the  Food  and 
Agricultural Policy Simulator  (FAPSIK)  model  of USDA  (Gadson,  Price,  and 
Salathe,  1982).  Although Bancroft's equations were  revised slightly and 
reestimated for  the  FAPSIK  model,  the  implied acreage  slippage coefficients 
from  Gadson,  Price,  ana Salathe are very close to  those  reported by Bancroft 
(table 2). 
Evans  (1984)  calculated the effectiveness of diversion,  set-aside,  and acreage 
reduction programs  for wheat using year-to-year changes  in wheat area 
harvested and in acres diverted under wheat programs.  Using data for 1962-83, 
he calculated the ratio of total changes  in harvested acres  to total changes 
in diverted acres.  The  result (-0.65)  indicates that acreage programs  for 
wheat were  65  percent effective on average  in reducing harvested acreage.  Put 
13 another way,  this  implies  that a  l-million-acre  increase  in diversion resulted 
in only a  650,000-acre  reduction in area harvested.  Evan's calculations 
imply an acreage  slippage coefficient of 0.35  for wheat. 
In her work  on slippage,  Norton  (1985)  used a  profit function approach  to 
estimate  the effect of set-aside,  acreage  reduction,  and diversion programs  on 
acreage harvested and production using annual data for 1948-82.  The  study 
covered wheat,  corn,  and cotton.  The  model  developed by Norton contained six 
product supply equations  that were  estimated using the restrictions usually 
imposed on an aggregate profit function model  (Norton,  pp.  33-37).  The  model 
was  estimated with production and acreage harvested as  dependent variables  in 
two  separate estimations.  Norton used Zellner's seemingly unrelated 
regression  (SUR)  method because it provides more  efficient estimates  than OLS 
and allows behavioral restrictions to be  imposed on the equations.  For 
comparison,  the model  was  also estimated without any restrictions using OLS. 
Unfortunately,  the results were  not entirely consistent between the  two 
approaches,  suggesting specification problems.  The  acreage  slippage 
coefficient reported for wheat  from  the  SUR  model  is negative  (-0.08), 
indicating that acreage harvested decreased by an amount  greater than acreage 
diverted.  This  is not consistent with published data,  nor does it agree with 
results  from  other studies.  In contrast,  the estimates of acreage  slippage 
obtained from  the  OLS  model  are positive for all three crops  (table 2). 
An  important limitation of the  estimates produced by Norton is the way  in 
which prices were  incorporated into the model.  Norton used the average 
futures  price for  a  commodity  as  a  proxy for expected prices  faced by farmers 
in the year  in question.  However,  program participants and nonparticipants 
face  different prices.  When  acreage  reduction programs  are announced,  along 
with loan rates and target prices,  each farmer has  to make  an assessment of 
whether  they would be better off in or out of the programs  in the  coming year. 
The  decision to participate depends  on expected profits in and out of the 
program and this is difficult to model  ex post  because of a  lack of farm 
level data.  Bancroft accounted for this problem by endogenizing the 
participation rate.  Houck  and Ryan  handled it by defining an  "incentive 
price" which  took account of the prices facing  farmers  both within and outside 
of the program. 
Norton notes  the  limitations placed on her analysis by  the choice of the price 
variable.  In particular,  the expected price variable captures only part of 
the slippage effects discussed above.  For  example,  if output prices are 
expected to rise because of an acreage  reduction program,  then profit-
maximizing farmers will increase the use of nonland inputs  on  the  land 
remaining in production,  thereby boosting yields.  Similarly,  nonparticipants 
could increase the  amount  of land sown  to program crops.  Neither of these 
effects is captured by her estimated acreage  and production slippage 
coefficients but are  instead captured in the expected price variable. 
Therefore,  slippage will be underestimated because of the specification used 
for  the price variable. 
More  recently,  Dvoskin  (1988)  analyzed the effectiveness of set-aside,  acreage 
reduction,  and diversion programs  using an approach similar to  the  one 
14 employed by Ericksen and Richardson  (1975).  Using annual data for 1956-85,  he 
estimated acreage  slippage for  a  wide  range of  commodit~es including wheat, 
corn,  barley,  oats,  sorghum,  rice,  and cotton.  The  method used by Dvoskin 
estimated changes  in acreage harvested as  a  function of changes  in program 
acres  idled.  The  estimated coefficients were  significant for all crops  except 
barley. 
The  acreage  slippage coefficients  implied by Dvoskin's  results are very 
similar to  those of the other studies.  The  coefficients for wheat  (0.25), 
corn  (0.39),  and total cropland  (0.34)  are within the  range of estimates 
reported in table  2.  Although the acreage  slippage coefficient for  sorghum 
(0.42)  is significantly less than that obtained from  Gadson,  Price,  and 
Salathe,  it is only slightly lower  than the  one  estimated by Bancroft.  The 
coefficient for cotton  (0.37)  is somewhat higher than either of those 
estimated by Norton.  The  Dvoskin study was  th  )nly one of the studies 
reviewed that provided estimates of acreage sl.  .'ige  for oats  (0.38)  and rice 
(0.24). 
Yield SL.ppase 
In contrast to the considerable amount  of work  done  on acreage slippage, 
relatively little research has been undertaken on yield slippage.  As  noted 
earlier,  the potential for yield slippage arises  from  program participants 
withdrawing their least productive land from production first,  the 
substitution of other inputs  for  land,  and  investment in additional capacity 
as  a  result of higher returns  and less price risk under  the  farm programs. 
On  the first issue,  Weisgerber  (1969)  estimated the relative productivity of 
U.S.  cropland diverted under both annual  and long-term retirement programs 
during 1966  by comparing the average productivity of diverted cropland to  the 
average productivity of cropland in production.  His  results  showed  that the 
productivity of diverted cropland was  indeed lower  than that of cropland 
remaining in production and that it varied between crops.  Weisgerber 
estimated the relative productivity of diverted cropland at 90  percent for 
wheat,  85  percent for grain sorghum,  83  percent for barley,  82  percent for 
corn,  and 80  percent for cotton.  His  calculations are based on  the assumption 
that land idled under annual programs  would return to production of the crops 
from  which it was  diverted and that land in long-term retirement programs 
would be used to grow  program crops  in the proportion specified for annual 
programs. 
Ericksen  (1976)  defined acreage  slippage in terms  of the 
what  farmers  would harvest under  commodity  programs with 
diversion provisions.  The  effect of acreage restriction 
(yield slippage)  can be defined in similar terms: 
15 
difference between 
and without acreage 
programs  on yields 
(8) where: 
YS 1  - yield slippage for crop 1, 
YDl  - actual yield for crop  1  under  program provisions 
with acreage diversion requirements, 
~  - yield for crop  1  under program provisions 
without acreage  diversion requirements,  and 
ADl  - acreage of crop  1  diverted. 
The  effect of acreage reduction programs  on yields was  estimated indirectly by 
Lin and Davenport  (1982)  and Ash  and Lin  (1987).  Lin and Davenport  examined 
factors affecting corn yields  in the major producing regions of the United 
States over the period 1955-80.  The  yield of corn harvested for grain was 
estimated as  a  function of acreage planted to corn,  nitrogen application, 
precipitation,  temperature,  dummy  variables for corn blight and frost 
conditions,  and time  as  a  proxy for  technology.  The  results  indicated that as 
acreage planted increased,  yields declined. 
Ash  and Lirt also examined yield response  in the United States.  They  applied 
the specification developed by Lin and Davenport  to a  wider  range of crops  and 
regions.  The  commodity  coverage  included wheat,  corn,  barley,  oats,  sorghum, 
and rice.  Wheat  was  further dis  aggregated into spring and winter plantings. 
The  yield response equations were  estimated using OLS  and data generally for 
1956-84.  The  authors  found  that as planted acreage  expands,  average yields 
fall. 
Ash  and Lin calculated elasticities of yield and production with respect to 
acreage  changes  using the estimated coefficients on the  acreage planted 
variable and  the  following  identity. 
where: 
Eqa  - elasticity of production with respect to a 
change  in planted acreage,  and 
Era  - elasticity of yield with respect to  a  change  in 
planted acreage. 
The  elasticity of yield calculated for wheat  in the Northern Plains is  -0.41. 
The  authors conclude that a  10-percent reduction in acreage planted to wheat 
in the Northern Plains would raise average wheat yields by 4.1 percent. 
Assuming  100-percent compliance,  they estimate that this would reduce wheat 
production by only 5.9 percent.  Similar estimates were  made  for  the other 
commodities  in the  study. 
16 Ash  and Lin estimate  the yield effect of farmers'  withdrawing less productive 
cropland to comply with program requirements  in 1986.  Compared with no 
acreage reduction programs,  they estimated that in 1986  national average 
yields per acre were higher by  2.5 bushels  for wheat,  5.7 bushels  for corn, 
0.7 bushel  for barley,  0.1 bushel  for oats,  and 580  pounds  for rice.  They 
reported that the programs had no  measurable effect on sorghum yields. 
More  recently,  Love  and Foster  (1991)  examined  the effect of acreage  reduction 
programs  on yields  for corn,  wheat,  and soybeans.  (Although soybeans  are not a 
program-crop,  they compete with corn for  land.  Love  and Foster argue  that 
diversions of land from  corn potentially affect soybean yields in addition to 
corn yields.)  Using data covering 1964-86,  they estimated an eight-equation 
simultaneous  system that included per-acre production functions,  per-acre 
fertilizer demand  equations,  and equations explaining proportions of planted 
acreage relative to total acreage  (that is,  the  sum  of planted and diverted 
acreage).  The  specification of p::Jduction allowed for nonconstant yield 
slippage.  The  authors  argue  that  .,lippage  is likely to vary inversely with the 
level of land diverted.  The  expectation is that slippage is greatest at low 
levels of land diversion.  Their results support this hypothesis,  implying 
yield slippage elasticities of 29  to  37  percent for wheat,  48  to  58  percent 
for corn,  and 30  to  38  percent for  soybeans. 
Using  the results  from  Ash  and Lin and equation 9,  we  can calculate yield 
slippage,  that is how  much  national average yields per acre  increased on 
average  for each million acres diverted under  the programs  in 1986.  For 
wheat,  this  implies  an average yield effect or slippage coefficient of 0.123 
bushel per acre.  The  implied yield slippage coefficients for  the other 
commodities  included in this study are listed in table  3. 
The  formulation used in the studies by Lin and Davenport  and Ash  and Lin does 
not directly quantify the relationship between acreage  idled under acreage 
reduction programs  and yields.  Instead,  the authors  estimate the effect of 
acreage  reductions by using the calculated elasticities of yield. 
Table  3--Yield slippage coefficients for the United States 1/ 
Study 
GedIIon,  Price,  end 
Salathe (1982) 
Ash  ,  Lin  (1987) 
-- •  Not  availeble. 
Period  Wheat 
1951-'19  0.131 
1986  0.123 
Com  8erley  oats  Sorel".  Rice  Cotton 
0.473  0.344  1.332  540 if  5.4 if 
0.419  0.389  0.250  456 
Y  Increase in national  average yield per .HUon acres diverted fro. production U1der  progr_ 
provisions.  Units are bushels per acre for wheat,  corn,  barley, oats,  end sorghul;  pou1ds per acre for 
rice end cotton. 
if  Obtained fro. unpublished  research  undertaken by Mike  Price. 
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j The  yield equations that were  incorporated into the  FAPSIM  model  (Gadson, 
Price,  and Salathe,  1982)  explicitly quantify the relationship between 
diverted acreage  and yields.  In this formulation,  yields are estimated as  a 
function of acreage set-aside and diverted,  the ratio of crop prices  to  the 
price of fertilizer,  weather,  a  time  trend to reflect changes  in technology, 
and selected dummy  variables.  Yield equations were  estimated for wheat,  corn, 
barley,  sorghum,  rice,  and cotton using OLS  and data generally from  1950-79. 
The  results  from  this specification indicate that yields per acre harvested 
rise as  the acreage diverted by program participants increases.  For  example, 
the coefficient on  the diversion variable for wheat  implies  that for every 
million acres diverted from production under program provisions,  the national 
average wheat yield increased by 0.131 bushel.  Yield slippage coefficients 
estimated for  the other crops  in the  FAPSIM  model  can be  found  in table 3. 
For most  commodities,  these estimated slippage coefficients are very close to 
those that were  calculated from  the results of Ash  and Lin. 
Production Slippage 
Another  type of slippage discussed in the  economics  literature is production 
slippage.  Production slippage refers to  the situation where  production of a 
crop changes by less than the  amount  implied by  the acreage  reduction 
programs.  The  coefficient of production slippage is a  more  comprehensive 
measure of the slippage effect in that it attempts  to capture  the  combined 
effect of acreage  reduction programs  on both acreage harvested and yields. 
Ericksen  (1976)  defined production slippage in the  following  terms: 
where: 
PS1  production slippage  for  crop I, 
AHl  acreage of crop  1  that farmers  would harvest under 
program provisions without acreage diversion 
requirements, 
YHl  yield for  crop  1  given AHl  acres harvested, 
AHl  actual acreage of crop  1  harvested under  the  same 
program provisions with acreage diversion 
requirements, 
~  actual yield for crop  1  with ~  acres harvested,  and 
ADl  acreage of crop  1  diverted. 
(10) 
Two  different approaches have been used to estimate the magnitude of 
production slippage for U.S.  crops.  Norton  (1985)  estimated the effects of 
acreage reduction programs  on the area harvested and production of wheat, 
corn,  and cotton (see Acreage  Slippage section above).  She  used the estimated 
coefficients  from  a  system of product supply equations  to calculate production 
slippage coefficients directly.  The  production slippage coefficients were 
18 calculated as  follows: 
SC =1- EDC*10 
P  AYD  (11) 
where: 
SCp  - slippage coefficient for production, 
EDC  - estimated coefficient on the acreage diversion 
variable in the product supply equation with 
production as  the dependant variable,  and 
AYD  - average yield per acre for 1956-82. 
The  coefficient on  the acreage diversion variable  (EDC)  is an estimate of the 
production effect of the acreage  reduction programs per acre  increase  in 
diversion.  In terms  of Ericksen's  formula,  this coefficient represents an 
estimate of  [(~  x~) - (AH1  x  YH1)]  /  AD1 • 
The  slippage coefficients  from both the  SUR  and OLS  equations are presented in 
table 4.  The  estimate of production slippage for wheat  from  the  SUR  equation 
(0.343)  indicates that for every million acres  idled under  the program 
provisions for wheat,  production of wheat declined by the equivalent of 
657,000 harvested acres.  This  result implies  that production slippage is 
about  34  percent for wheat,  that is,  acreage  reduction programs  for wheat were 
about  66  percent effective in reducing production.  Results  from  the other 
equations estimated with  SUR  suggest that production slippage is over  30 
percent for corn and is just slightly less than 50  percent for cotton.  For 
wheat  and corn,  the  OLS  estimates reported by Norton are considerably 
different.  They  imply that production slippage for wheat is almost  70 
percent,  while for corn it is close  to zero. 
Table  4--Production slippage coefficients for the United States 
Study  Period  llleat  Corn  larley  oat.  Sorghua 
Norton  (1985)  1948-82 11  0.343  0.312 
1948-82 if  0.692  0.067 
Herlihy,  Haley,  end 
Johnaton (1992)  1986 V  0.434  0.563  0.394  0.380  0.582 
-- •  Not  available. 
11  Celc:ulated fro. c:oeffic:ient. esti_ted using ....  ingly unrelated regres.ion (SUR). 
Y  Celc:ulated fro. c:oeffic:ient. eati_ted using ordinary leut squarea  (O&.S). 
V  Calc:ulatiOl"lll  shown  in table 5. 
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Ric:e  Cotton 
0.496 
0.606 
0.429  0.423 
I We  calculated production slippage coefficients  from  the  ST86  model  using the 
formula developed by Ericksen.  Acreage  and yield slippage coefficients  from 
selected studies and 1986  data were  used to obtain estimates of area harvested 
and yield in the absence of acreage reduction programs  (AH1*  and YH1*).  The 
calculation of these variables is described in the next section of this 
report.  Production slippage coefficients are not used directly in the  ST86 
model  (acreage and yield slippage coefficients are used instead),  but rather 
are calculated to compare with other studies. 
Our  results  indicate that production slippage for wheat,  barley,  rice,  and 
cotton is between 35  and 45  percent,  while  for corn and sorghum,  it is closer 
to  55  percent  (table 4).  The  slippage coefficient for wheat  is within the 
range of estimates reported by Norton,  while  the coefficient calculated for 
corn is higher than its SUR  and  OLS  counterparts.  The  coefficient calculated 
for cotton  (0.423)  is very close  to  the  one  estimated for cotton by Norton 
using SUR.  For barley,  oats,  sorghum,  and rice,  no  production slippage 
coefficients were  available for comparison. 
Calculating of the Effect of Removing 
Acreage Reduction Programs 
The  following section illustrates how  acreage and yield slippage coefficients 
are used in the Static World Policy Simulation  (SWOPSIM)  modeling  framework  to 
calculate the effect of removing acreage  reduction programs.  Detailed 
information on  the  SWOPSIM  framework  is provided in Roningen  (1986)  and 
Roningen and Dixit  (1989). 
The  methodology used in SWOPSIM  to capture  the effect of removing acreage 
reduction programs  is similar to  the approach developed by Magiera  (1985)  for 
the  OECD  Ministerial Trade Mandate  (MTM)  model.  First,  a  quantitative 
estimate is made  of the effect of removing acreage restrictions on the 
production of program commodities,  given certain assumptions  about slippage. 
Then  to simulate agricultural policy reform,  the  observed supply curves  for 
these  commodities  are exogenously shifted to reflect this effect,  at the same 
time  that PSE's  and CSE's  are  removed  (Haley,  1989). 
If acreage restrictions were  100-percent effective in reducing production 
(that is,  no  slippage),  then estimating the effect on supply of removing these 
restrictions would be  straightforward.  Take  wheat,  for example.  In 1986, 
60.723 million acres of wheat were harvested for grain in the United States at 
a  national average yield of 34.446 bushels per acre.  This  resulted in 2.092 
billion bushels  (56.926 million metric  tons)  of wheat being produced.  To  be 
eligible for  CCC  loans  and deficiency payments,  wheat producers were  required 
to idle 25  percent of their established crop acreage base.  Of  this amount, 
22.5 percent was  to be enrolled in the  acreage  reduction program  (ARP),  while 
2.5 percent was  to be placed in the paid land diversion program  (PLD).  In 
addition,  winter wheat producers were  given the option of placing an 
additional  5  or 10  percent of their land in the paid land diversion program. 
As  a  result of these annual programs,  20.4 million acres were  removed  from 
20 production.  5 
Assuming  that all 20.4 million acres would:  curn to wheat production if the 
ARP  and  PLO  programs were  removed  and that  )  percent of this acreage would 
actually be harvested  (based on historica  ,arvested-to-planted ratios),  then 
the production effect is simply  the  numbc~ of acres diverted times  the 
harvested to planted ratio times  the observed national yield  (20.4 million 
acres * 0.86 * 34.446 bushels per acre - 604  million bushels).  Thus,  removing 
U.S.  acreage reduction programs  in a  case where  we  assume  no  slippage  (and all 
else is held constant)  would cause  the U.S.  supply curve for wheat  to shift to 
the right by approximately 604  million bushels  (16.4 million metric  tons)  or 
29  percent of 1986  wheat production.  This estimate provides  an upper bound on 
how  much  the U.S.  supply of wheat might  increase as  a  result of removing  the 
ARP  and  PLO  programs  in place in 1986. 
The  studies surveyed in this report  indicate that there is considerable 
evidence of slippage under U.S.  commodity  programs.  The  approach used in 
SWOPSIM  to calculate the effect of removing acreage reduction programs 
accounts  for  the effects of both acreage  and yield slippage.  The  procedure  is 
divided into four  steps.  First,  acreage  slippage coefficients are used to 
estimate the number of diverted acres  that would actually return to production 
of program commodities.  Second,  the  change  in national average yields due  to 
the elimination of these programs  is estimated using yield slippage 
coefficients for each program commodity.  Third,  the results  from steps 1  and 
2  are used to estimate  the average yield,  area harvested,  and production that 
can be  expected in the absence of acreage  reduction programs.  Finally,  the 
estimated production effect and  exogenous shift terms  for  the domestic  supply 
curves are calculated. 
Table  5  presents  the data and selected acreage  and yield slippage coefficients 
used to calculate the effect of removing U.S.  acreage  reduction programs.  A 
detailed description of the procedure used to calculate the  supply shift terms 
is provided below for  the case of wheat.  Details on the calculation of the 
production slippage coefficient for wheat are also provided below. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We  analyzed the results of respecifying the model  and running several 
alternative trade liberalization scenarios.  First,  we  examined the 
implications of assumptions  as  to how  U.S.  acreage reduction programs are 
modeled in the context of two  alternative supply elasticity specifications. 
Then,  we  examined the effect of assumptions  about the degree  to which U.S. 
agricultural policies aredecoupled from  production. 
~is total  does  not  include  land enrolled  in  the  long-term conservation 
reserve program. 
21 Slippa,e and Hodel  Supply Elasticities 
Three  scenarios are  run to analyze  the sensitivity of trade liberalization 
results to differing assumptions  about  the effectiveness of u.s.  acreage 
reduction prograas.  The  first scenario assumes  no  slippage.  That is, all land 
diverted under acreage reduction programs  is brought back into production of 
the commodity  from  which it was  diverted,  and no  adjustment is made  to  the 
average yield.  The  second scenario assumes  some  acreage  slippage in that not 
all diverted land is brought back into production.  The  third scenario assumes 
that average yields are affected as diverted land is brought back into 
production (yield slippage).  The  amount  of land brought back into production 
is the  same  as  in the  second scenario. 
Table  6  shows  the  supply shift factors used to capture the effect of removing 
u.s.  acreage reduction programs  for  the slippage specifications discussed 
above.  Accounting for both area and yield slippage reduces  the shift factor 
by  53  percent for corn but only  38  percent for wheat.  The  other commodities 
fall between these extremes.  The  estimated yield effect of the programs  is 
strongest for wheat  and rice.  It comprises  two-thirds of the shift reduction 
for wheat  and more  than half of the reduction for rice.  Yield slippage 
matters  the least for cotton;  it constitutes less than one-quarter of the 
supply shift reduction. 
Table  7 lists the estimated production effect for grains  and cotton of 
eliminating acreage reduction programs  in the United States.!  The  different 
slippage assumptions  imply a  wide  range of possible production effects.  For 
corn,  the difference between the  no  slippage case and the area and yield 
slippage case  is quite large  (12.1 million metric tons).  For wheat,  the 
difference is roughly half that of corn  (6.2 million metric tons),  while  for 
other coarse grains,  rice,  and cotton,  the difference is considerably smaller 
(2.2,  1.1,  and  .2 million metric  tons,  respectively). 
Slippage assumptions are examined in the context of two  elasticity 
specifications.  The  first retains  the agricultural commodity  supply 
elasticities used in ST86  at their default values.7  The  second specification 
uses  supply elasticities set at half the default value  for all coaaodities in 
all regions of the model.  The  elasticities are  lowered to analyze  the 
implications of assuming that resources  are more  fixed in agriculture than is 
currently assumed in ST86.  For a  multilateral trade liberalization scenario, 
this specification implies smaller world price increases.  Greater U.S.  excess 
supply and a  lower foreign supply response to subsidy removal  implies greater 
downward  pressure  (or less upward pressure)  on world prices to keep world 
markets  in equilibrium. 
&rhese  estimates  incorporate  adjustments  in world  markets  resulting  from 
changes  in  commodity  prices  due  to  an  increase  in U.S.  supply  of  grains  and 
cotton.  As  a  result,  the  production  increases  are  slightly  less  than  those 
estimated with fixed prices. 
7See  Gardiner,  Roningen,  and  Liu  (1989)  for  documentation  of  the 
elasticities used in ST86. 
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T.,le 5--U.S  • ...,ly _1ft MIl pI"OClEt:ian al i~  CIIleulationa for 1986 
Acreage  Acreage  Acreage  Yield  Chllnge  Observed  Observed  Observed  No·progr..  No-progr..  No-progr ..  Esti_ted  Supply  Production 
Diverted  slippage  returning  slipp88e  in  area  average  production  area  average  production  production  shift  sli~ 
Ca.odity  11  coefficient  to  coefficient  average  harvested  yield  harvested  yield  illpeCt  factor  coefficient 
production  yield 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (1)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
!!illf  !!!  !!i!!!m  IY!!!!l!  .Mill ion  IY!!!!!!  Thyend  Mill ion  IY!!!!!!  IhYB  IhyS 
I£tu  I£[!l  li!!r  IS:r!  acru  liSe  IErl  !!!sri" S!!!J!  I£!:!l  ~  .etric tons  Metric  tons 
Wheat  20.4  .25  15.300,  .131  2.004  60.123  34.446  56,926  76.023  32.442  67,122  10,196  .17'9  .434 
Corn  13.6  .39  8.296  .475  3.924  69.159  119.228  209,556  n.455  115.364  226,973  17,417  .083  .563 
Other  coarse 
grains Y  4.5  4.500  32.726  42,730  35.496  45,739  3,009  .070  .497 
Barley}l  1.8  .34  1.188  .344  .409  12.007  50.847  13,293  13.195  50.438  14,490  1,198  .090  .394 
Sorghun  2.3  .42  1.334  1.332  1.m  13.859  67.691  23,830  15.193  65.914  25,438  1,608  .067  .582 
oats  0.4  .38  .248  0  0  6.860  56.320  5,608  7.108  56.320  5,811  203  .036  .380 
Rice y  1.3  .24  .966  540.0  521.618  2.360  5648.0  6,049  3.326  5,126.4  7,738  1,689  .27'9  .429 
Cotton y  3.3  .37  2.07'9  5.4  11.227  8.357  547.0  2,073  10.436  535.8  2,536  463  .223  .423 
.. •  Not  applicable. 
11  Includes  acreage enrolled In  the acreage  recU:tlon progr_ (ARP)  end  paid  lend diversion progr_ (PLD).  Land  enrolled in the conservation reserve progr_ is not 
included. 
if  The  other coarse grains supply shift end  production slippage coefficient are the weighted  average of  barley,  oats,  and sorghu.. 
~  The  esti_ted acreage  sl  ippage  coefficient for barley was  not  significant  in the Dvoskin  study.  The  average  sl  ipp88e  coefficient fro. Dvoskin  is used  for barley. 
y  Yield  is reported  in pou1ds  for acre. 
Notes  end Sources: 
Col.  1 :  USDA,  CCC  Report. 
Col.  2 :  USDA,  Dvoskin  AER  580. 
Col.  3 - [(Col.  1)*[1-(Col.  2»)). 
Col.  4  :  USDA,  FAPSIM  MODEL. 
Col.  5 - (Col.  3)*(Col. 4). 
Col.  6  :  USDA,  Crop  Production,  1988. 
Col.  7 :  USDA,  Crop  Production,  1988. 
Col.  8  :  [(Col.  6)*(Col.  7»)*conversion factor. 
Col.  9 - (Col.  3)+(Col.  6). 
Col.  10.  (Col.  7)·(Col. 5). 
Col.  11- [(Col.  9)*(Col.  10»)*conversion factor. 
Col.  12- (Col.  11)-(Col. 8). 
Col.  13- (Col.  12)/(Col. 8). 
Col.  14- 1 - [(Col.  12)/[(Col.  1)*(Col.10»)). 




























Source:  Calculated by the authors. 





























Source:  Results  from  SWOPSIM  ST86  multilateral trade liberalization 
scenarios. 
The  world price effects of agricultural  tra~ liberalization under different 
slippage and elasticity assumptions are presented in table 8.  For each 
commodity,  the changes  can be  grouped around the elasticity assumptions.  The 
world price changes  corresponding to  the default elasticity case are 
considerably larger than those corresponding to  the  low elasticity case.  The 
low elasticity scenarios  show  the possibility of world price reductions for 
corn,  other coarse grains,  and cotton.  Predicted price declines for  these 
commodities are due  primarily to  the effect of diverted land coming back into 
production in the United States.  The  downward  pressure put on world prices_as 
a  result of the  increase in U.S.  crop area outweighs  the supply response in 
the United States and elsewhere  to the elimination of domestic producer 
subsidies. 
24 Table  8--World price effecta of agricultural trade liberalization by the 
industrial market  econoaies,  1986 
Default el.sticities  Low  elasticities 
CCIIIIIIOdity  No  sli~  Ar .. 
slippage 
Are.  and 
yield sl  ippage 
No  sl ippage  Ar .. 
slippage 
Ar .. and 
yield sl  ippage 
Percentaae chanae  frQl base 
Wheat  27.0  29.7  33.2  9.6  13.8  19.2 
Corn  14.8  20.9  25.6  ·9.5  -1.7  4.6 
Other  coarse grairw  18.0  20.5  22.6  -3.2  1.0  4.8 
Rice  22.7  23.7  24.7  18.5  20.3  22.2 
Cotton  5.3  8.4  9.3  -6.3  -1.6  -0.1 
Source:  Results fro. SWOPSIM  ST86 .ultilateral trade liberalization scenarios. 
Within each elasticity grouping,  the  slippage specifications  show  a  range of 
world price outcomes.  The  most significant differences are  for wheat  and corn. 
The  range of outcomes  for  the world price of wheat is 6  percentage points for 
the default elasticity case,  and nearly 10 percentage points  for  the  low-
elasticity case.  In 1986,  area diverted under  the programs  for wheat was  equal 
to about one-third of area harvested  (20.4 million acres diverted versus  60.7 
million acres harvested).  The  range of outcomes  for corn is even larger:  11 
percentage points for  the default elasticity case  and 14  percentage points for 
the  low-elasticity case.  The  percentage of corn area diverted in 1986  was 
smaller  (13.6 million acres diverted versus  69.2 million acres harvested),  but 
the United States is a  bigger player in global export markets.  (U.S.  exports 
accounted for  69  percent of world corn trade in 1986,  compared with only 31 
percent of world wheat  trade.)  Assumptions  about how  much  of the acreage 
diverted in the United States will return to production have  important 
implications for predicting world price changes  following agricultural trade 
liberalization. 
Predicted changes  in U.S.  supply and net trade are presented in table 9.  In 
all but one  case,  the model  predicts reductions  in production and net trade 
for other coarse grains following multilateral liberalization.  For cotton,  the 
results depend on the elasticity used:  supply and net trade reduction for  the 
default elasticity case and expansion for  the low-elasticity case. 
The  results for wheat,  corn,  and rice follow a  similar pattern.  For  the  low-
elasticity case,  there is expansion in both production and net trade.  Here, 
the effect of reintroducing land idled under U.S  acreage  reduction programs 
and the world price effect dominate  the effect of removing domestic producer 
subsidies.  For  the default elasticity case,  there is uniform production and 
net trade expansion only for  the no-slippage case.  There  ~re uniform declines 
in both production and net trade only when  both acreage  .A  yield slippage are 
accounted for.  In this case,  the effect of removing domes ,_  'Producer 
subsidies dominates  the effect of reintroducing acreage  dC~ed  in the United 
States and  the world price effect. 
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I These results illustrate the  importance of assumptions  regarding the 
effectiveness of U.S.  acreage  reduction programs  and agricultural commodity 
supply elasticities.  Large  amounts  of cropland were  removed  from production in 
1986  under U.S.  acreage reduction programs.  Because  the United States is a 
major producer and exporter of grains  and cotton,  assumptions made  in modeling 
acreage reduction programs  for  these  commodities  significantly influence  trade 
liberalization outcomes.  Also,  if agricultural resources are relatively 
immobile,  even over a  5- year period,  then the effect of multilateral 
liberalization on world agricultural production and trade will be 
substantially different from  a  situation where  resources are free  to move  to 
other sectors of the  economy. 
Decouplina 
The  methodology used in ST86  assumes  that the entire PSE  is coupled to 
production.  However,  recent research suggests  that provisions of the  Food 
Security Act of 1985  have  decoupled U.S.  deficiency payments  from  actual 
production. levels.  In addition,  other components  of PSE's  for U.S.  grains and 
cotton -- such as agricultural research and extension programs,  subsidized 
grain inspection services,  grain storage subsidies,  and interest subsidies 
may  also be  decoupled in the  5-year time  frame  used by the model.  Therefore, 
an alternative scenario was  run in which U.S.  agricultural policies  included 
in the  PSE's  for grains  and cotton were  assumed  to be partially decoupled.  In 
the alternative scenario reported below,  the price wedges  for U.S.  grains and 
cotton were  cut by  50  percent. 
Table  10  shows  predicted world price effects of agricultural trade 
liberalization from scenarios  in which U.S.  policies are assumed to be either 
fully coupled or partially decoupled.  Assuming U.S.  policies are partially 
decoupled results in smaller predicted increases  (or larger predicted 
decreases)  in world prices for grains and cotton following multilateral 
liberalization.  The  reason is that lower levels of support are  removed  for  the 
United States,  U.S.  producers  supply more,  so world prices rise by less  (or 
fall by more)  compared with the fully coupled case.  Corn is a  good  example. 
The  base  ST86  run  (which assumed policies are fully coupled,  accounted for 
both area and yield slippage,  and used the default elasticities) predicted 
world prices would rise nearly 26  percent,  while  the decoupled scenario with 
similar slippage and elasticity assumptions predicted they would rise only by 
half that amount.  The  differences for  the no-slippage case are even larger. 
The  use of the  reduced price wedges  changes  the direction of world price 
change  only in two  cases:  cotton  (no  slippage,  default elasticities) and corn 
(full slippage,  low elasticities). 
26 Table  9--U.S.  supply and net trade effects of agricultural trade liberalization, 
1986 
Default el.sticities  Low  el ..  ticities 
Ca.odity  No  sl  ippage  Area  Area  and  No  slippage  Area  Are.  and 
sl  ippage  yield sl  ippage  slippage  yield sl  ippage 
1.000 Metric  tOOl  11 
~ly 
Whe.t  2,509  723  -2,352  8,902  6,962  3,518 
(4.4X)  (1.3X)  (-4.1X)  (15.71)  (12.21)  (6.21) 
Corn  2,256  -3,166  -6,915  15,230  8,080  3,010 
(1.1X)  (-1.5X)  ( -3.3X)  (7.3%)  (3.9%)  ( 1.5%) 
Other  coarse 
graina  -5,529  -6,586  -7,036  284  -1,061  -1,678 
(-12.81)  (-15.21)  (-16.21)  (0.71)  (-2.5X)  (-3.9%) 
Rice  347  -11  -393  1,184  760  308 
(8.1X)  (-.3X)  (-9.21)  (27.71)  (17.81)  (7.21) 
Cotton  -76  -212  -244  323  145  102 
(-3.6X)  (-10.OX)  (-11.5X)  (15.3X)  (6.9%)  (4.81) 
Net tra 
Whe.t  3,287  1,505  -1,472  9,475  7,575  4,316 
(12.3X)  (5.6X)  (-5.5X)  (35.4X)  (28.3X)  ( 16.1X) 
Corn  5,903  2,107  -510  15,352  10,737  7,565 
(15.1X)  (5.4%)  (-1.3X>  (39.3X)  (27.5X)  (  19.4X> 
Other  coarse 
gr.ina  -8,034  -9, ,  -9,64~  -2,448  -3,710  -4,279 
(-107.71)  (-122  (-129.<  (-32.81)  (-49.81)  (-57.4X) 
Rice  397  41  -339  1,226  805  357 
(15.1X>  ( 1.6X>  (-12.81>  (46.5X)  (30.5X)  (13.61) 
Cotton  -69  -201  -231  314  143  102 
(-4.71>  (-13.81)  (-15.9%)  (21.5X>  (9.81)  (7.  OX> 
11  Percentage change  fr~ bue is reported  i ....  i.tely below  the supply and  net tra  quantities. 
Source:  Raul ts  fr~  SWOPSIM  ST86  II.Il tH.ter.l trade liber.lization scenarios. 
27 Table  10--Wor1d price effects of agricultural trade 
liberalization under differing decoupling assumptions,  1986 
Fully coupled  50  perc.,t decoupled 
C~ity  110  sl  i ppete 
What  27.0 
com  14.8 
Other coar  ......  i.,.  18.0 
Rica  22.7 
Cotton  5.3 
What  9.6 
Com  -9.5 
Other coar .. gr.i.,.  -3.2 
Ric.  18.5 
Cotton  -6.3 
Ar  .. ..:t 
yield sl  ippege 
110  sl  i ppege 
Percent", chlOp!  fr91 bese 
D.feult .lasticiti  .. 
33.2  18.5 
25.6  2.9 
22.6  10.7 
24.7  20.3 
9.3  -1.0 
Low  .l.sticities 
19.2  3.9 
4.6  -16.0 
4.8  -8.1 
22.2  16.5 
-.1  -10.8 
Ar  .. ..:t 











Sourc.:  R  ..  ults fro. SWOPSIM  ST86 .ultil.ter.l trade liberaliz.tion aceNIrioa. 
The  supply effects resulting from  different decoupling assumptions are shown 
in table 11.  There are larger U.S.  supply effects assuming that U.S.  policies 
are more  decoupled.  A smaller negative U.S.  subsidy effect is less of an 
offset to the production enhancing effects of reintroducing set-aside land and 
of removing foreign producer subsidies.  Take  wheat,  for  example.  Using the 
default elasticities and assuming no  slippage,  the model  predicts that U.S. 
wheat production will increase by nearly 17  percent when  policies are assumed 
to be partially decoupled,  compared with only a  4-percent increase when  no 
decoupling is assumed.  If acreage  and yield slippage are both accounted for, 
the  increase in wheat production is reduced to 7.3 percent for  the partially 
decoupled case.  However,  when  policies are assumed to be  fully coupled,  U.S 
production of wheat is predicted to decline by over 4  percent.  The  pattern is 
similar for  the low-elasticity specifications,  although no  production declines 
are predicted. 
Welfare 1Rplications 
Producer welfare will change if the trade negotiations are successful in 
eliminating subsidies affecting production and trade.  Producer surplus is the 
economic measure used in the  SWOPSIM  modeling  framework  to account for changes 
in producer welfare  (Haley and Dixit,  1988).  Changes  in producer surplus 
account for  the  changes  in returns to fixed factors  such as  land and perhaps 
some  forms  of farm  labor. 
28 Tabla  ll--U.S.  supply effects of agricultural trade liberalization 
under differing decoupling assumptions,  1986 
Fully coupled  50  percent  decoupled 
C~fty  110  slf~  Area  end  yield  No  slippege  Ar .. end  yield 
slippage  slippage 
1·000 Metrjc  tons .v 
Default elasticities 
Wheat  2,509  -2,352  9,577  4,178 
(4.41)  ( -4.11)  (16.81)  (7.31) 
Com  2,256  -6,915  12,869  2,689 
(1.11)  (-3.31)  (6.11)  (1.31) 
Other  coerse 
graina  -5,529  -7,036  -1,017  -2,n5 
(-12.81)  (-16.21)  (-2.41)  (-6.31) 
Rice  347  -393  1,109  262 
(8.11)  (-9.21)  (25.91)  (6.11) 
Cotton  -76  -244  215  26 
(-3.61)  (-"  .51)  (10.11)  (1.31) 
Low  elasticities 
Wh ..  t  8,902  3,518  12,n1  7,015 
(15.71)  (6.21)  (22.41)  (12.31) 
Corn  15,230  3,070  21,061  7,561 
(7.31)  (1.51)  (10.11)  (3.61) 
Other  coerse 
graina  284  -1,678  2,351  193 
(.71)  (-3.91)  (5.41)  (51) 
Rice  1,184  308  1,621  690 
(27.71)  (7.21)  (37.91)  (16.11) 
Cotton  323  102  512  268 
(15.31)  (4.81)  (24.21)  (12.71) 
Y  Percentage change  fro. base  fs  reported i-.diately below  the Sl4lPly  quantities. 
Source:  Results fro. SWOP51M  5T86 .ultilateral trade liberalfzation scenarios. 
Table  12  shows  the changes  in producer surplus corresponding to each of the 
modeling assumptions.  For  the fully coupled case,  model  results  imply that 
there are substantial producer losses resulting from multilateral trade 
liberalization.  In spite of relatively large gains  in production,  the producer 
losses  from  the low-elasticity case exceed those of the default case.  Although 
the  same  unit subsidies are  removed  in both elasticity runs,  lower world price 
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I Tabla  12--Cbanaa in producer .urplu. in the United State. from 
a,ricultural trade liberalization,  1986 
Defeult eleaticiti ..  Low  eluticiti  .. 
C~ity  Coupled  50  percent  Coupled  50  percent 
decoupled  decoupled 
!UUi5!! sl2Ulrl 
No  al ippege: 
.....  t  -4,479  -2,029  -5,169  -2,497 
Corn  -8,312  -4,807  -11,125  -6,922 
Other coer  .. greina  -1,785  -943  -2,177  -1,256 
Rice  -998  -356  -835  -303 
Cotton  -1,692  -907  -1,897  -497 
Acreage  .nd yield 
al ippep: 
"'eet  -4,036  -1,739  -4,755  -2,174 
Corn  -6,708  -3,412  -9,288  -5,207 
Other coer  .. greina  -1,593  -812  -1,958  -1,081 
Rice  -168  -379  -879  -364 
Cotton  -538  -',295  -1,784  -935 
Source:  Reaul ta fro. SWOPSIM  5T86  ...  l tileterel  trecle  l iberelizetion ac  .....  rioe. 
changes  in low-elasticity case limit producer gains.  Also,  because  fixed 
costs  form  a  higher percentage of total costs in the low-elasticity case,  any 
negative effect on producers will more  strongly affect resources  fixed in the 
agricultural sector.  Within each elasticity classification,  our assumptions 
regarding area and yield slippage have little effect on producer surplus.  The 
decoupled specifications  show  producer losses about  50  percent lower  than the 
corresponding fully coupled specification.  Although world prices do  not 
increase as much  in the coupled scenario,  removing smaller initial price 
wedges  leads  to a  smaller decrease  in U.S.  producer prices and,  thus,  producer 
welfare. 
Conclu.ion. 
Deficiency payments  and acreage restrictions are  important components  of U.s. 
agricultural programs  for wheat,  corn,  other coarse grains,  rice,  and cotton. 
It is i.portant that economists  and policymakers  concerned with the effect of 
agricultural trade liberalization understand the net effect of removing 
policies that distort production and trade.  There are varying degrees of 
consensus  regarding the effects of set-asides and deficiency payments  on U.S. 
commodity production. 
This  report has presented results of sensitivity tests ERS's  Trade 
Liberalization  (TLIB)  model.  The  effects of agricultural trade liberalization 
by the  industrialized market economies  were  examined using different 
30 assump~ions about slippage,  model  supply elasticities,  and decoup1ing.The 
slippage assumptions  deal with the method of projecting the effect on 
production of reintroducing land that had been set aside as  a  requirement  for 
program participation.  Either all land withheld from  production is put back 
into production of program commodities  or only a  portion of it.  Then,  either 
average yields change  as  a  result of the additional planted acreage or average 
yields are unaffected.  These differing set-aside assumptions  are  shown  to 
have  significant effects on possible  trade liberalization outcomes.  Depending 
on the  commodity,  world price changes  can vary by as much  as  10  percentage 
points as  a  result of worldwide  policy reform.  The  effect on U.S.  net trade 
of wheat,  corn,  and rice is very sensitive to  the average yield effect.  In 
spite of these  outcomes,  the projected effects of trade liberalization on 
producer welfare are fairly close regardless of the set-aside assumption 
employed. 
More  significant challenges  to  ST86  results come  from varying model  supply 
elasticities that reflect the degree  to which agricultural resources are 
believed to be  immobile,  that is,  not transferable for use  to other sectors of 
the  economy.  Also,  the degree  to which deficiency payments  are assumed to be 
decoup1ed  from production imply  trade liberalization outcomes  less severe  than 
those  implied in the base model  solution.  If additional research is to be 
performed,  then higher returns are likely to be  derived from  examining the 
elasticity and decoup1ing  issues  rather than the set-aside issue. 
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34 Appendix 
The  results  from  tables  10 and 11  are depicted in the  figures  in this 
appendix.  Figures  2-6  show  world price changes  for  the  grains products  and 
cotton.  The  bars  in each figure  represent for  a  commodity  the  range of 
outcomes  corresponding to  the elasticity and decoupling scenarios.  The  top of 
a  bar shows  the  outcome  assuming both acreage  and yield slippage,  and  the 
bottom of a  bar shows  the  outcome  assuming no  slippage.  Figures  7-11  show  U.S. 
crop production changes  corresponding to  the  same  set of scenarios.  In these 
figures,  however,  the  top of the bar shows  the no  slippage case,  while  the 
bottom of the bar shows  the acreage  and yield slippage case. 
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I Figure 2  World  Wheat  Price Changes 
Results  from  Differing Scenarios 
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Figure"  Other Coarse Grain  Price  Changes 
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Figure 3  World  Corn  Price Changes 
Results  from  Differing Scenarios 
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Figure 5  World  Rice  Price  Changes 
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Figure 8  World  Cotton Price Changes 




01  II  Ii 
-5 
-10  ~ 
-15'L-----~-----------L----------~~----------~----~ 
c.  ..  A-ooupled  c ...  A-decoupled  c  ...  I-ooupled  c  ••• I-d.ooupl.d 
Scenarios 
A • Default ....  t •••  Low ....  t. 
Top of bar • fuH allppage. 
Botto. 01 bar • no .lIppage. 
Figure 8  Changes  in  Corn Production 
Results  from  Differing Scenarios 
1,000 ..  trlc ton. 





01  II 
-I 
t--=rr-==  •••• ! 
_10'L  ____  ~  ____________  L_  __________  ~  __________  ~  ____  _J 
c... A_111M  e ••  A doo.upl..  Cu. "0 ..  ,,"  C_  I-decouple. 
A • Default ....  t •••  Low ....  L 
Top of bar • No aIIp.-oe. 
Botto. 01  bar • fuN  allppage. 
Scenario. 
37 
Figure 7  Changes  in  Wheat  Production 
Results  from  Differing Scenarios 
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Figure 11  Changes  in  Cotton Production 
Results  from  Differing Scenarios 
600,  ----------------l 
400 
200 
~  ~ 
II 
o 11----------------
-200  ~ 
-400'  ---'------~ 
Ca.e A-coupled  Cue A-decoupled  Ca.e B-coupled  Ca.e B-decoupled 
Scenarios 
A •  Default elast. B  • Low elast. 
Top  of bar· No slippage. 
Bottom of bar· full slippage. 